spotlight europe 01/2017: Reforming Economic and Monetary Union: Legislation and Treaty Change by Fabbrini, Federico
spotlight europe
spotlight europe #2017/01
Reforming Economic and Monetary Union: 
Legislation and Treaty Change
This paper examines the legal mechanisms for reforming EMU — EU legislation, 
amendments to intergovernmental treaties concluded outside EU law, and 
EU treaty changes. It provides guidance on how to introduce several needed 
changes to EMU, suggesting that many reforms can be accomplished à traité 
constant, but that improving the EU institutional system ultimately  
requires changing the EU treaties.
Federico Fabbrini *
1. Introduction
The reform of Europe’s Economic and Monetary Union 
(EMU) remains on the agenda of the institutions 
and the member states of the European Union (EU). 
Several high-level institutional reports on deepening 
and  completing EMU have been published in the last 
few years, and the European Commission is expected 
to deliver by March 2017 a white paper mapping how 
to strengthen the Eurozone economy and its insti-
tutional set-up. This effort acquires a new meaning 
since it  coincides with the likely trigger that month 
by th e United Kingdom (UK) of negotiations to leave 
the  EU. Brexit has already prompted soul-searching 
wit h in the EU and created the need to think anew 
about  Europe’s strategic future. The purpose of this 
paper is to  contribute to this debate, by analyzing the 
legal wa ys and means to reform EMU — on the un-
derstanding that the success of the European integra-
tion project also depends on the successful resolution 
of the Euro-crisis and consolidation of EMU.
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There are three legal avenues to reform EMU, complet-
ing and deepening Europe’s architecture of economic 
governance: 1) through EU legislation adopted within 
the framework of the current EU treaties; 2) through 
amendment of intergovernmental treaties concluded 
outside the framework of EU law; 3) through amend-
ment of the EU treaties themselves. As the paper 
claims, EU legislation suffices to introduce several 
 important innovations in EMU, including the comple-
tion of Banking Union through a European common 
deposit guarantee scheme and setting up a European 
unemployment insurance fund — as well as incorpo-
rating in EU law the Fiscal Compact and creating an 
EU fiscal capacity. Amendments of intergovernmental 
treaties are required to upgrade the European Stabil-
ity Mechanism. Amendments of EU treaties, finally, 
are needed to overhaul the Eurozone’s institutional 
architecture, mutualize debts via Eurobonds, or create 
a debt-restructuring mechanism. 
As the paper points out, reforming EMU through 
legislation is easier than by amending treaties — and 
many EMU reforms could be already undertaken now, 
à traité constant. Nevertheless, Brexit creates a window 
of  opportunity to introduce far-reaching revisions to 
the EU treaties, and this should quickly be exploited 
to endow the EU with a more perfect constitutional 
 architecture. Treaty changes are indeed required to 
address the deep legitimacy deficit exposed by the 
 Euro-crisis and its aftermath.
2. Proposals for EMU reform
There is a growing consensus on the need to 
 reform EMU’s architecture. The leaders of the 
EU’s  institutions have long stressed the urgency 
of  putting EMU on a more solid basis, and devised 
 various road-maps to this end. In December 2012, 
the  President of the European Council, in coopera-
tion with the Presidents of the European Commis-
sion, Eurogroup and European Central Bank (ECB) 
 released a plan “Towards a Deeper EMU.”1 In July 
2014, the new Commission President emphasized 
the importance of stabilizing EMU in his  inaugural 
speech to the European Parliament.2 And in June 
2015, a new report making the case for  “Completing 
Europe’s EMU” was released by the President of the 
European Commission, in coordination with the 
 Presidents of the European Council, Eurogroup, ECB 
and European Parliament.3
National leaders have also endorsed the goal of 
 stabilizing EMU. Despite the emergence of new 
 crises – from Brexit to migration, and internal and 
external security threats — EMU has remained an 
item on the agenda of heads of state and govern-
ment. The Bratislava Declaration of September 2016 
reaffirmed the importance of economic and social 
development in the EU.4 And a number of national 
governments have advanced proposals to further 
strengthen EMU. In particular, French and German 
economics ministers Emmanuel Macron and Sigmar 
Gabriel jointly made the case in June 2015 for Euro-
zone  reform, strengthening the institutional frame-
work and favoring public investments,5 while the 
Italian finance minister Pier Carlo Padoan put forward 
in February 2016 a  comprehensive policy strategy for 
growth, jobs and stability in the EMU.6
Finally, the European Parliament has consistently 
called for further steps towards EMU integration.7 
And this institutional focus on EMU reform is 
 reflected in a wider public and academic debate. As 
early as 2012 the Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa report 
of Notre  Europe advanced a road-map toward fiscal 
union.8 Calls to further integrate the Eurozone have 
been made by  intellectuals in Germany (the  Glienicker 
Group) in October 2013,9 and in France (the Eiffel 
Group) in  February 2014.10 And although concern for 
the Euro-crisis has tended to slip from public view, 
the debate has been relaunched recently. In particular, 
the report “Repair and Prepare: Growth and the Euro 
after Brexit,” published in September 2016 by the 
 Bertelsmann Stiftung and the Jacques Delors Insti-
tutes in Berlin and Paris, devised a plan de route to 
make EMU fit for purpose.11
Most blueprints on EMU reform are structured in 
three phases, distinguishing steps to be taken in 
the short-, mid-, and long-term. Hence, roadmaps 
 toward a deeper and more genuine EMU firstly iden-
tify measures that can, and should, be taken imme-
diately — usually because they are either politically 
uncontroversial, or economically indispensable to 
the Eurozone’s stabilization. Secondly, they outline 
a subsequent set of reforms that ought to be carried 
out in a clearly-defined time-horizon, because these 
usually require greater political capital (coming from 
national elections) or more protracted economic 
adjustments. Last, all reports conclude with more 
ambitious proposals for comprehensive systemic 
and institutional reforms to be undertaken some ten 
years down the road with the goal of complementing 
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EMU with a real Political Union, in whatever guise. 
While all reports acknowledge the difficulty of moving 
toward a federal-type model for EMU, they still stress 
the importance of finalité in Europe’s future.
The purpose of this paper is to examine the reform 
of EMU from a legal perspective. The paper dis-
cusses several proposals recently put forward and 
evaluates how they can be implemented in legal 
terms.  Accordingly, it distinguishes between: 1) 
measures that can be adopted within the current 
EU treaty framework, through EU legislation (see 
Section 3  below); 2) measures which can be adopt-
ed without treaty change, but by amending other 
 inter-governmental agreements — such as the 
European Stability Mechanism (ESM) — concluded 
outside the EU’s legal framework (Section 4); and 
3) measures which can be adopted only by amend-
ing the EU  treaties (Section 5). As the paper posits, 
because changing treaties is a more complex and 
burdensome procedure than adopting legislation 
within the current EU treaty framework, measures 
which fall in the first group can be implemented 
with greater speed than measures which fall in the 
second and third group. However, the need to adapt 
the EU legal order in light of Brexit  offers a window 
of opportunity to change the EU  treaties also as far 
as EMU is concerned.12
In discussing the legal measures to be carried out 
on these three lines, the paper does not consider 
the  legitimacy aspects raised by each proposal. Yet 
by mapping the avenues for legal and institutional 
 reforms in the EMU and signalling their complexity, it 
aims to provide a compass on what is constitutionally 
possible in the short-, mid-, and long-term in EMU.
3. Reforms through EU legislation
Multiple legal measures to reform EMU can be adopted 
within the current EU treaty framework.13 On the 
side of stability, measures can be taken to improve 
economic policy coordination and foster the process 
of convergence among the Eurozone member states. 
Legislative steps in the direction of an “Economic 
 Union”14 can be adopted (on the basis of Articles 
121 and 126 Treaty on the Functioning of the EU 
(TFEU)). These include creating Competitiveness 
Boards15 —  designed to provide independent advice to 
national  governments on structural reforms — and 
upgrading the European Semester, so as to increase 
ownership and compliance with the Country Specific 
Recommendations.16 A special legal basis (Article 
136 TFEU) is then available to put in place particular 
measures relating to the Eurozone only — e.g. 
examining the Eurozone’s overall fiscal stance in 
Eurogroup debates on the Annual Growth Survey.17 
Moreover, while the rules of the Stability and Growth 
Pact (SGP) have been strengthened since the Euro- 
crisis,18 the current EU constitutional framework 
would permit further steps towards enhancing 
fiscal surveillance, such as incorporating within 
the EU legal order the key substantive provision of 
the Fiscal Compact.19 Article 3 of the Treaty on the 
 Stability Coordination and Governance within the 
EMU (TSCG) — which was  concluded in March 2012 
by 25 of the then 27 EU member states (all, except the 
UK and the Czech  Republic) — requires contracting 
parties to maintain an annual structural deficit of 
0.5% of GDP. This requirement, moreover, is to 
be put into domestic law “through provisions of 
binding force and permanent character, preferably 
constitutional or otherwise  guaranteed to be fully 
respected and  adhered to throughout the national 
EMU reforms that can be accomplished through EU legislation include:
- Incorporation of the Fiscal Compact in EU law
- Greater coordination of member states’ budgetary policies
- Completion of Banking Union through a European Deposit Insurance Scheme
- Enhancement of the social dimension of EMU via a European Unemployment Insurance Scheme
- Launch of an expanded investment plan
- Creation of an EU Fiscal Capacity
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budgetary process.” This clause could already be 
brought back within the framework of EU law — with 
all the related  benefits in terms of administrative and 
judicial enforcement — through a regulation (based on 
Articles 121 and 126 TFEU) combined with the use of the 
enhanced cooperation procedure (foreseen in  Articles 
326-334 TFEU) by the 25 EU member states which 
signed up to the TSCG.20
The current EU treaty framework, however, also allows 
for further integration steps on the side of  solidarity. 
Hence, measures to complete Banking Union with 
a European Deposit Insurance Scheme (EDIS) could 
be accomplished without any treaty change by 
 resorting to Article 114 TFEU.21 The goal of establish-
ing a functioning internal market at the core of this 
provision would be an adequate legal basis to com-
plement the Single Supervisory Mechanism22 and the 
Single  Resolution Mechanism23 with a Europe-wide 
risk-sharing mechanism among national deposit 
insurance schemes — as repeatedly demanded, not 
least, by the ECB.24 It would also allow steps towards 
the creation of a Capital Markets Union, e.g. with EU 
legislation favoring securitization.25
In addition, current treaties would permit new legal 
measures to tackle the dire problem of unemployment. 
While the Euro-crisis has come at a high social cost, 
particularly in some EU countries,26 new, well-artic-
ulated proposals have been made to endow the EU 
with an unemployment insurance fund, able to tackle 
cyclical downturns in employment rates within one 
member state which occur because of asymmetric 
shocks inside EMU.27 In particular, Articles 174 and 175 
TFEU, which empower the EU institutions to develop 
and pursue action strengthening economic, social 
and territorial cohesion, would seem a suitable legal 
basis to pursue the creation of a European Unemploy-
ment Insurance Scheme (EUIS). If a EUIS were to be 
 restricted to Eurozone member states only, Article 136 
TFEU would then have to be used in conjunction with 
the above-mentioned provisions to strengthen EMU’s 
social dimension.28
The EU legal framework, moreover, allows for a great 
deal more action impacting upon EMU. First, the EU 
treaties grant to the EU institutions extensive power 
to intervene in the functioning of the internal  market. 
Indeed, Article 119 TFEU explicitly states that “the 
economic activities of the Member States and the 
Union shall include, as provided in the Treaties, the 
adoption of an economic policy which is based on the 
coordination of the Member States’ economic pol-
icies, on the internal market, and on the definition 
of common objectives.”29 Hence, further legislative 
steps to complete the internal market, e.g. in services, 
could be pursued through the Community method by 
the Parliament and Council,30 with positive spill-overs 
onto EMU.31
Second, no constitutional change is required to pro-
mote a broader program of public investments — a 
development often invoked as a mid-term reform 
of EMU.32 As the example of the European Fund 
for  Strategic Investments (EFSI) underlines,33 the 
EU already enjoys the competence — in the field of 
 industry (Article 173 TFEU), technological develop-
ment  (Article 182 TFEU), and economic, social and 
territorial  cohesion (Article 174 TFEU) — to start a 
program of public investment designed to stimulate 
the economy and promote growth. Indeed, additional 
legal  bases — on  trans-European networks (Article 
170 TFEU), on research (Article 179 TFEU) and on 
energy (Article 194 TFEU) empower the EU institu-
tions to launch a  comprehensive public and private 
investment initiative — even beyond the simple plan 
to extend the life of the EFSI and increase its funding 
recently brought forward by the Commission.34
Last but not least, the current EU treaty framework 
 already permits the adoption of an EMU reform 
 regarded by all policy and institutional reports as due 
in the long-term: creating a fiscal capacity for the EU 
(or the Eurozone), supported by European taxes.35 In 
fact, Article 113 TFEU empowers the Council, acting 
unanimously in accordance with a special legislative 
procedure and after consulting the European Parlia-
ment to adopt legislation on the harmonization of 
taxation. At the same time, Article 311 TFEU states 
that “[t]he Union shall provide itself with the means 
necessary to attain its objectives and carry through its 
policies.” Although this clause does not mention EU 
taxation explicitly, it affirms that “[w]ithout prejudice 
to other revenue, the budget shall be financed  wholly 
from own resources.” As I have argued elsewhere, 
these two Articles can be read in conjunction as 
 empowering the EU institutions to raise the finan-
cial resources necessary to sustain a fiscal capacity.36 
Indeed, the European Commission proposed using 
Article 113 TFEU to introduce a Financial Transaction 
Tax (FTT) 37 or a Common Consolidated Corporate Tax 
Base 38 — and indicated that the revenues derived 
from this tax would be assigned to the EU budget (in 
lieu of other member states’  financial transfers).39 
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Needless to say, the use of Articles 113 and 311 TFEU 
raises a range of complicated issues connected with 
the  requirement to reach unanimity in the Council. 
However, this hurdle could be overcome by adopting 
a single harmonized EU tax through the enhanced 
cooperation procedure — as effectively done with the 
FTT 40 — although adopting differentiated integration 
on the revenue side would inevitably have an impact 
on the expenditure side.
In conclusion, ample legal room exists to reform EMU 
within the current treaty framework — if there is the 
political will.
4. Reforms through amendments of 
intergovernmental agreements
EMU reforms that can be accomplished through amendment of intergovernmental treaty include:
- Upgrade of the ESM
- Creation of a rapid-response facility
A second set of reforms of EMU can only be accom-
plished by amending intergovernmental agreements 
concluded by groups of member states outside 
the framework of EU law. Leaving aside here the 
 question whether the EU principle of institutional 
 balance should constrain the use of such accords,41 
 member states have, in response to the Euro-crisis, 
often stepped outside the framework of EU law and 
 adopted EMU-related measures through interna-
tional  treaties. The ESM Treaty, in particular, was 
concluded  unanimously in February 2012 by all the 
member states of the Eurozone to ensure the euro 
area’s  financial  stability.42 According to its  Article 3, 
“the purpose of the ESM shall be to mobilize funding 
and provide stability support under strict condition-
ality [...] to the benefit of ESM Members which are 
experiencing, or are threatened by, severe financing 
problems, if indispensable to safeguard the finan-
cial stability of the euro area.” To this end, the ESM 
is  endowed with an authorized capital stock of €700 
 billion paid by the Eurozone countries, which is 
handled by a Board of Governors on which Eurogroup 
finance ministers sit.43
Recent proposals have made the case for reforming 
the ESM, either by bringing it back within the frame-
work of EU law,44 or by strengthening it  externally.45 
One suggestion is that the ESM could be upgraded 
by creating a rapid-response facility of €200  billion 
for secondary market purchases of government 
bonds (de facto replacing the ECB Securities Market 
 Programme 46), and that this revamped ESM could 
also be used as a back-stop for the Single Resolution 
Fund dealing with bank failures.47 Moreover, to tackle 
the deficiencies ensuing from the ESM’s intergov-
ernmental structure, another suggestion is that the 
Eurogroup President should take on a leading role in 
managing the ESM, with national parliamentarians 
involved through an inter-parliamentary conference 
to  improve democratic oversight. 
Any proposal to modify the ESM along these lines 
would require an amendment to the ESM Treaty. This 
does not foresee special procedures for its revision. 
But pursuant to customary principles of interna-
tional law — codified in the Vienna Convention on 
the Law of the Treaties — international agreements 
can be modified with the consent of all the contract-
ing parties. Hence, unanimous approval of all the 
19 member states that are contracting parties to the 
ESM Treaty would be necessary to amend it. In some 
member states, however, such amendments would 
be subject to ex ante judicial review as a condition for 
ratification. In Germany, in particular, the Bundes-
verfassungsgericht (Federal Constitutional Court) 
authorized ratification of the ESM Treaty in its final 
judgment of March 2014 requiring among other things 
that the German government takes steps to ensure 
that its veto power be maintained under any future 
treaty changes.48 Any new amendment would there-
fore have to pass the test of some national constitu-
tional courts — with all the uncertainties that follow. 
 Assuming the amendments do not affect Article 48 
of the ESM Treaty, the revised treaty could instead 
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enter into force when a super-majority of contracting 
 parties deposit their instruments of ratification.
5. Reforms through EU treaty amendments
 
EMU reforms that can be accomplished through amendment of the EU treaties include:
- Overhaul of the EU constitutional system through new EU institutions
- Introduction of qualified majority voting for decision-making on tax issues
- Debt mutualization
- Debt-restructuring mechanism
A last set of reforms to enhance EMU can be accom-
plished solely by revising the EU treaties. In particular, 
such amendments are necessary to introduce  changes 
to the current EMU institutional architecture.49 
Indeed, apart from the proposal to ensure a unified 
 external representation of the Eurozone in interna-
tional  financial institutions 50 — which is specifically 
foreseen by Article 138 TFEU — and that to appoint 
the  Commissioner for Economic and Financial  Affairs 
(ECFIN) as President of the Eurogroup 51 — which 
is permitted by the vague language of Article 2 of 
Protocol No. 14 on the Eurogroup — all other options 
for institutional reform would require treaty change. 
This includes, among  others, the proposals to  appoint 
the ECFIN  Commissioner as permanent Chair of the 
 ECOFIN Council 52 — which would require an amend-
ment to  Article 16(9) Treaty on EU (TEU) — or to create 
a  Eurozone treasury 53 — which would call for a sig-
nificant re-allocation of powers between the Council 
and the Commission.54 Indeed, a treaty change would 
be necessary even to bring back within the framework 
of EU law the institutional provisions of the Fiscal 
 Compact, and in primis its Article 12, which creates the 
Euro Summit and provides for its President — along 
the model of the European Council and its President.55
In addition, also a number of substantive reforms 
of EMU would be permissible only through treaty 
reform. Although the current treaty framework leaves 
ample room for legislative action, measures such as 
 creating Euro-bonds, or setting up a debt redemption 
fund,56 could only be possible through treaty change: 
since the mutualization of governments’ debt is 
 currently prohibited by Article 125 TFEU, the only kind 
of  Euro-bond that might be permitted today is one 
backed exclusively by EU assets. For the same reasons, 
another proposal often made sottovoce in discussions 
about EMU’s future — i.e. creating an orderly debt- 
restructuring mechanism 57 — would necessitate a 
specific grounding in the EU treaties. 
The procedure to amend the EU treaties is regulated 
in Article 48 TEU, which distinguishes between an 
ordinary and a simplified revision procedure. Given 
the nature of the constitutional changes discussed 
above — which amount to an expansion of EU powers, 
or touch upon provisions of the EU treaties which are 
outside the current Part III of the TFEU — the simpli-
fied revision procedure could not be used. The  ordinary 
revision procedure would therefore be needed: this 
requires the setting up of a Convention (unless the 
European Parliament consents to avoid this), the 
approval of the amendment by the representatives of 
all the member states within an intergovernmental 
conference, and ratification by each member state in 
accordance with its own constitutional requirements. 
It goes without saying that reforming EMU via EU 
treaty amendment is more burdensome than doing so 
via EU legislation. But it should also be considered that 
EU treaties have regularly been amended during the 
last 25 years, and that Brexit creates the need for new 
treaty change anyway.58 
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Conclusion
The purpose of this paper has been to analyze from a 
legal perspective a number of proposals for  reforming 
the EMU. In recent months numerous reports — by 
the EU institutions, national governments, and 
 European think-tanks — have advanced blueprints for 
 deepening and completing Europe’s EMU, outlining 
a roadmap to repair and prepare the euro after  Brexit. 
As the paper has pointed out, EU treaties already 
 allow for the adoption of a wide variety of reforms in 
the field of EMU — both on the stability-side and on 
the  solidarity-side. While further steps to enhance 
multilateral fiscal surveillance remain possible, the 
EU treaties also allow the completion of Banking 
 Union, the creation of a Capital Markets Union and 
the establishment of a EUIS. In  addition, the current 
EU constitutional regime provides a solid basis to 
 re-launch public investments, and complete the single 
market. Finally, the existing treaty framework would 
permit also steps toward an EU fiscal capacity — based 
on real own  resources. Given the emphasis on Euro-
pean public goods by the High Level Group on Own 
 Resources chaired by Mario  Monti,59 a fiscal capacity 
would be a valuable instrument to  restore a degree of 
output legitimacy in the EU.
Several other reforms of EMU cannot be accomplished 
through EU legislation only. Calls to upgrade the 
ESM could only be achieved by amending the ESM 
 Treaty — which would require the unanimous consent 
of the 19 Eurozone countries, and national ratifica-
tion under the oversight of domestic constitutional 
courts. Initiatives to reform the EMU institutional 
architecture could only be undertaken by amending 
the EU treaties — on the basis of the ordinary revision 
procedure enshrined in Article 48 TEU. In the end, the 
adoption of a number of institutional reforms in the 
EMU architecture appears inevitable in the long run 
if the EU is to gain adequate input legitimacy.60 And 
Brexit may offer a window of opportunity. However, 
reforms of the EMU through treaty amendment — just 
like those through EU legislation — remain dependent 
on the willingness, foresightedness and leadership of 
those national and European policy-makers who care 
about the future of Europe. 
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